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COHERENCE IN THE AGE OF STATUTES
ROSS GRANTHAM* AND DARRYN JENSEN**
The High Court of Australia, in pursuing coherence between common law 
and statute law, has limited itself to ensuring that the rules of common 
law and statute law should be free of contradiction. The Court does not 
appear to have embraced the idea, which lies at the core of some major 
theories of private law, that a set of rules is coherent only if the set can 
be explained as the outworking of a single principle. Applying that idea 
to the relationship between common law and statute law is confronted 
by some serious challenges. In the past, coherence as non-contradiction 
(combined with the idea of parliamentary supremacy) has worked well as 
a means of reconciling common law with statute law, but the proliferation 
of legislation in recent years and the character of much modern 
legislation has drawn attention to the limitations of such an approach to 
the question. A more exacting approach to coherence of common law and 
statute law, on the other hand, would require the revision of some widely-
held assumptions about the nature of law, such as the core assumption of 
legal positivism that the ultimate criterion of the authority of the law is its 
pronouncement by an authoritative institution.  
I  INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the idea of coherence in the law, both as that concept is used 
by the High Court of Australia and more generally. It also considers whether 
the conceptual nature and normative values that underpin legislation and the 
common law,1 and in particular the private law, are such that they can be melded 
into a coherent and seamless whole. When the High Court speaks of ‘coherence’, 
its focus is almost entirely on consistency in the operation of rules: that the law 
should not have rules that mandate opposite courses of action.2 Several major 
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1 The term ‘common law’ is used in a variety of senses: A W Brian Simpson, ‘Common Law’ in Peter 
Cane and Joanne Conaghan (eds), The New Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, 
2008) 164, 164–5. For present purposes, we will use ‘common law’ in its two most common senses. 
First, in terms of its source, we use it to describe that body of law that arose through the process of 
adjudication, as opposed to having been promulgated by Parliament. Second, in terms of its content, 
we use it to describe that body of law that historically and still predominately is concerned with 
relations between individuals qua individuals, and which is also described as private law. These two 
senses are not precisely co-extensive, but there is a substantial overlap between them.
2 Both Stephen McLeish and Elise Bant seem to take this view, although neither explore the broader 
meaning of the idea of coherence: Stephen McLeish, ‘Challenges to the Survival of the Common 
Law’ (2014) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 818, 827; Elise Bant, ‘Statute and Common Law: 
Interaction and Influence in Light of the Principle of Coherence’ (2015) 38 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 367, 368.
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theories of private law, by contrast, envisage a concept of coherence which is 
more exacting in its demands. Complete coherence of a set of rules is achieved 
only if the set can be explained as the outworking of a single principle. 
Conventionally, inconsistencies between legislative rules and common law have 
been resolved by a rule of parliamentary supremacy.3 Accordingly, in cases such 
as Miller v Miller, the High Court has concluded that common law rights could 
not be asserted to the extent that their assertion would be inconsistent with the 
intention of a statute.4 Conceptually, this rule has functioned as a meta-principle 
that assumed the silo-like separation of legislation and common law and resolved 
inconsistencies by prioritising legislative rules over those of common law rules. 
As long as legislation was targeted and was limited in volume, as had been the case 
until fairly recently in the history of the Anglo-Australian legal system, legislative 
intrusions into the otherwise seamless perfection of the common law could be 
treated as mere exceptions.5 This approach largely preserved the coherence (in the 
second, more exacting sense) of the basic fabric of the law, which was provided 
by common law. However, the second half of the 20th century saw a massive 
proliferation of legislation. During 1901 (the first year of federation), legislation 
enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament amounted to just 488 pages. In 1997, 
that figure had increased to 7521 pages6  — a 15-fold increase — and the pace of 
addition to the body of legislation has increased since then.7 Today, whole areas of 
law that as recently as 30 years ago were largely if not entirely left to the common 
law are now matters of legislation.8 Moreover, the style and reach of legislation 
has changed. Legislation is no longer limited to making specific changes to 
common law doctrine or restating settled areas of the common law.9 Instead, it 
seeks to establish comprehensive legal regimes that replace the common law for 
3 McLeish, above n 2, 834.
4 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 473 [73]–[74], 481–2 [101] (‘Miller’). Other cases in which the 
High Court has discussed the idea are Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581 [55]; Sons of 
Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160, 186 [35]; CAL No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents 
Insurance Board (2009) 239 CLR 390, 407–9 [41]; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton (2012) 246 CLR 
498, 514 [25]; Legal Services Board v Gillespie-Jones (2013) 249 CLR 493, 525 [119]; Australian 
Financial Services and Leasing Pty Ltd v Hills Industries Ltd (2014) 253 CLR 560, 625 [156].
5 Andrew Burrows, ‘The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the Law of Obligations’ 
(2012) 128 Law Quarterly Review 232, 234. Burrows noted that, historically, most legislation 
necessarily assumed the existence and preservation of the common law as the basic fabric against 
which the legislative changes had to be seen and understood. The advent of statutory codes that cover 
the entire field mean this assumption is no longer necessary. 
6 Justice K M Hayne, ‘Australian Law in the Twentieth Century’ (2000) 74 Australian Law Journal 
373, 376. See also McLeish, above n 2, 821.
7 Chris Berg, ‘Policy without Parliament: The Growth of Regulation in Australia’ (2007) 19(3) IPA 
Backgrounder 1, 4. Berg’s analysis shows a sudden leap in legislative production in the late 1980s. 
Berg also shows that the output of state legislatures has increased at similar rates.
8 For example, company law, the law of personal property securities, labour law, and consumer law 
are all now substantially, if not entirely, comprised of statutory rules: see, eg, Personal Property 
Securities Act 2009 (Cth); Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth); Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
9 The great 19th century statutes dealing with partnership, bills of exchange and sale of goods were 
restatements of a settled body of common law. On the other hand, the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861, 24 & 25 Vict, c 100 was a miscellany of specific changes: Jack Beatson, ‘Has the Common 
Law a Future?’ (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 291, 299. See also Alan Rodger, ‘The Codification 
of Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 570.
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large areas of legal regulation but, falling short of complete codification of the 
private law, exist side-by-side with remnants of the common law. Areas such as 
company law,10 personal property securities law,11 and consumer law are now 
largely statutory.12 The law of torts in Australia has also undergone significant 
statutory reform and modification.13 When the volume of legislation was small 
and legislation, for the most part, sought to make relatively modest and specific 
changes to the common law, the interaction of common law and legislation could 
successfully be managed by principles of statutory interpretation that narrowly 
confined the import of legislative intent.14 In the ‘age of statutes’15 in which we 
now live, the issue of the relationship between legislation and common law and 
whether these two bodies of law can be rendered into a coherent whole is one of 
the utmost importance and one which cannot be ignored or resolved by the simple 
expedients of the past. 
II  THE CONCEPT OF COHERENCE
Inspired by the writings of John Rawls16 and Ronald Dworkin,17 as well as the 
demands of contemporary legal practice,18 the idea of coherence in the law 
10 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), whether or not initially intended as a code, has effectively covered 
the field: see Ross Grantham, ‘The Proceduralisation of Australian Corporate Law’ (2015) 43 Federal 
Law Review 233.
11 The Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) effected a wholesale and virtually complete 
replacement of the common law, with a system that employs an approach (based on substance over 
form) and terminology that is alien to the common law tradition.
12 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 (‘Australian Consumer Law’). See also Bant, ‘Statute 
and Common Law’, above n 2, 372.
13 See generally Barbara McDonald, ‘Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The Common 
Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 443.
14 Roscoe Pound, ‘Common Law and Legislation’ (1908) 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 385. See 
generally Arthur Corbin, ‘The Dead Hand of the Common Law’ (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 668. For 
a recent example, see Weiss v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 300, 305 [9].
15 Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard University Press, 1982); Ian 
Ramsay, ‘Corporate Law in the Age of Statutes’ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 474. 
16 See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971). His concept of 
reflective equilibrium is widely interpreted as being about coherence.
17 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). His argument from 
integrity is commonly understood to be a principle of coherence, where coherence is both central 
to intelligibility of the legal system and an independent virtue. Cf Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public 
Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Clarendon Press, 1994) 261–303.
18 Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, 593 (McHugh J); Esanda Finance 
Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241, 297–8 (Gummow J); Sullivan 
v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581 [55]; Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic (2007) 231 CLR 160, 242 
[227]; Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2007] 1 AC 181, 204 [51]. See also, 
Justice J D Heydon, ‘Limits to the Powers of Ultimate Appellate Courts’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly 
Review 399, 400, quoting Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (Oxford University Press, 7th 
ed, 1964) 298; Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, ‘Australia’s Contribution to the Common Law’ (2008) 
82 Australian Law Journal 247, 253; Stefano Bertea, ‘The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and 
Evaluation’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 369, 369.
Coherence in the Age of Statutes 363
has been a topic of sustained and deep thought.19 In addition to the intuitive 
appeal of the idea that the law is something more than a random assemblage of 
unrelated and inconsistent rules, coherence in the law is held up as an essential 
precondition of a legitimate legal system.20 While views differ as to whether it is 
an independent virtue,21 coherence is nevertheless central to the idea of the law as 
being intelligible.22 Only that which is coherent is intelligible and intelligibility is 
in turn a necessary precondition of any system that purports to establish reasons 
for action. As a fundamentally normative system, it is, therefore, an essential 
precondition that the legal system makes sense as a whole and be free from internal 
contradiction.23 Coherence also connects with another necessary condition of 
a legitimate legal system, the rule of law: ‘In setting down the conditions for 
the proper exercise of powers, the rule of law stipulates, among other things, 
constancy in the law. No such constancy can be assured in a normative system 
that fails to present a sufficient degree of coherence’.24
In its most basic sense, coherence denotes simply that a set of rules is coherent if it 
is free from contradiction.25 Rules which belong to the same legal system must not 
prescribe different outcomes in relation to the same set of facts. This requirement 
underpins, for example, the legal conclusion that, if statute law prohibits the 
making of a contract of a particular kind, then the law of contract must regard 
such contracts as unenforceable.26 The rule that ‘parties to contracts shall perform 
those contracts’ and the rule that ‘no person shall make a contract which has 
the attribute X’, taken individually, prescribe different outcomes when applied to 
situations involving X. These two rules make up a coherent set only if contracts 
with the attribute X are excluded from the scope of the first rule. Contracts with 
the attribute of X, being a class of consensual undertakings which people are not 
allowed to make, cannot be taken to belong to the class of consensual undertakings 
which people are required to perform (ie contracts). A requirement to perform 
such an undertaking would contradict the law’s commitment to the notion that 
19 The body of literature is enormous, but important contributions have been made by Neil 
MacCormick, ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’ in Aleksander Peczenik, Lars Lindahl and Bert 
van Roermund (eds), Theory of Legal Science (D Reidel Publishing, 1984) 235; Raz, above n 17, 261; 
Kress, ‘Coherence and Formalism’, above n 16; Ken Kress, ‘Coherence’ in Dennis Patterson (ed), A 
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing, 2nd ed, 2010) 521; Amalia 
Amaya, The Tapestry of Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Coherence and its Role in Legal 
Argument (Hart Publishing, 2015).
20 Kress, ‘Coherence and Formalism’, above n 19, 536.
21 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Codification, Coherence, and Proprietary Competitions’ in Kurt Siehr and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Draft Civil Code for Israel in Comparative Perspective (Mohr Siebeck, 
2008) 149, 153.
22 This lies at the heart of Dworkin’s argument from integrity: see generally Dworkin, above n 17.
23 See generally Barbara Baum Levenbook, ‘The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ (1984) 3 Law 
and Philosophy 355.
24 Bertea, above n 18, 386. See also D Neil MacCormick and Robert S Summers, ‘Interpretation 
and Justification’ in D Neil MacCormick and Robert S Summers (eds), Interpreting Statutes: A 
Comparative Study (Dartmouth Publishing, 1991) 511, 535.
25 See generally Robert Alexy and Aleksander Peczenik, ‘The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance 
for Discursive Rationality’ (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 130.
26 Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410, 413; Miller (2011) 242 
CLR 446, 457, citing Cope v Rowlands (1836) 2 M & W 149, 157; 150 ER 707, 710.
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no such contract shall ever be made. That is perhaps one of the more obvious 
consequences of pursuing coherence as consistency or lack of contradiction. 
It is in this most basic sense, as mere consistency in the operation of rules, that 
the High Court should be understood as having referred to coherence. In Nelson v 
Nelson,27 a woman had arranged for the title to a house which she had previously 
purchased to be transferred to her son in order to qualify for a low interest defence 
housing loan. The High Court concluded that Mrs Nelson was able to assert that 
the son held the title to the house on resulting trust for her.28 Since this was a case 
in which the presumption of advancement arose — the transfer of the title being 
from parent to child — Mrs Nelson had to refer to her purpose of fraudulently 
obtaining the loan in order to argue that a resulting trust arose on the facts of the 
case. Nevertheless, the arrangement whereby Mrs Nelson transferred the legal 
title to the house to her son while expecting to retain beneficial ownership was not 
illegal. What was prohibited by the relevant statute was her false representation 
to the relevant government authority that she did not have a beneficial interest in 
the house. Therefore, Mrs Nelson was able to assert her rights in equity subject 
to repaying to the relevant government authority the value of the benefit that she 
received by making the false representation. McHugh J said:
As the examination of the Act has disclosed, it contains internal mechanisms for 
dealing with false declarations and applications by persons who are not entitled 
to subsidised advances. The Act recognises that ineligible persons may apply for 
subsidised advances and provides for recovery of the subsidy paid in relation to 
such persons. These provisions lend weight to the submission of the appellant that 
the policy of the Act will not be defeated if the Court enforces her equitable rights. 
They also suggest that the policy of the Act is not frustrated so long as there is 
recovery of the benefit given.29 
In short, it was consistent with the purpose of the relevant statutory provisions to 
allow Mrs Nelson to assert an equitable interest in the house.
Similarly, in Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Haxton,30 the central issue was whether allowing 
the plaintiff to assert its claim would undermine the purpose of a statute. More 
specifically, the controversy between the parties concerned whether the amount 
27 (1995) 184 CLR 538 (‘Nelson’). The High Court’s decision in Nelson represented a sharp difference of 
opinion with the House of Lords in Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 (‘Tinsley’). The High Court 
in Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 was unanimous that neither of the views expressed in Tinsley were 
appropriate. The minority approach in Tinsley was felt to be both unfair, in that it denied recovery 
irrespective of the relative blameworthiness of the parties, and inconsistent with equity’s general 
tendency to eschew harsh decisions. Dawson and McHugh JJ also thought that the minority in Tinsley 
were mistaken in applying the clean hands principle: at 579–80; 608. The High Court also thought 
that the majority approach in Tinsley was equally inappropriate: at 559 (Deane and Gummow JJ); 580 
(Dawson J); 593 (Toohey J); 609 (McHugh J). This approach, which Toohey J described as the ‘triumph 
of procedure over substance’, failed to take account of the seriousness of the illegality and produced 
results that turned on such arbitrary factors as the state of the pleadings and whether the presumption of 
resulting trust or advancement applied: at 592–3. In Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liq) [2015] 2 WLR 
1168, the UK Supreme Court appears to have kept faith with Tinsley, though there remained sharp 
disagreements amongst their Lordships: at 1175 [14].
28 Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538, 571–2.
29 Ibid 616.
30 (2012) 246 CLR 498 (‘Equuscorp’).
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payable under certain loan agreements that were illegal by statute could be 
recovered by way of an action for money had and received.31 The problem with the 
loan agreements was that they were an integral part of investment schemes which 
had been marketed to investors in a way which did not comply with s 170 of the 
Companies (Victoria) Code.32 While s 170 did not, of itself, prohibit the making of 
the loan agreements, enforcing the loan agreements against the investors would 
have undermined the legislative purpose of protecting the investors.33 Fidelity 
to the purpose of the statute, which required that the loan agreements not be 
enforced, also required denial of recovery by way of an action for money had and 
received:
Recovery from the investors would have been recovery from persons whose 
protection was the object of the statutory scheme … The failure of consideration 
invoked by Equuscorp was the product of [the lender’s] own conduct in offering 
the loan agreements in furtherance of an illegal purpose. This is a clear case in 
which the coherence of the law, and the avoidance of stultification of the statutory 
purpose by the common law, lead to the conclusion that [the lender] did not have 
a right to claim recovery of money advanced under the loan agreements as money 
had and received.34  
As in Nelson, the Court’s emphasis was upon coherence as lack of contradiction 
between the common law’s recognition of a cause of action and the legislative 
purpose. 
The High Court’s concern for coherence, so understood, has extended beyond 
cases concerning illegal trusts and contracts. In Miller,35 the High Court had to 
determine whether the fact that a person who was injured in a motor vehicle 
accident and had been a party to the theft and unlawful use of that vehicle precluded 
a finding that the injured person was owed a duty of care by her co-participant in 
the theft. The specific question was whether a provision of the Western Australian 
Criminal Code that made the theft and use of the vehicle unlawful pre-empted 
or suspended the normal operation of the tort of negligence.36 The High Court 
identified the central question as being:
would it be incongruous for the law to proscribe the plaintiff’s conduct and yet 
allow recovery in negligence for damage suffered in the course, or as a result, 
of that unlawful conduct? Other questions, such as whether denial of liability 
will deter wrongdoers or advantage some at the expense of others, are neither 
helpful nor relevant. And likewise, resort to notions of moral outrage or judicial 
indignation serves only to mask the proper identification of what is said to produce 
the response and why the response could be warranted.37
31 Ibid 514.
32 Companies (Application of Laws) Act 1981 (Vic) sch 4, as repealed by Legislation Reform (Repeals 
No 5) Act 2010 (Vic) sch 1. 
33 Equuscorp (2012) 246 CLR 498, 514 [25] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), 537 [96] (Gummow and 
Bell JJ).
34 Ibid 522–3 [45] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). See also 543–4 [111] (Gummow and Bell JJ).
35 (2011) 242 CLR 446.
36 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) sch 1 s 371A.
37 Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 455 [16] (citations omitted). 
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The question of whether the driver owed a duty of care (and was consequently 
liable to be sued in the tort of negligence) was not to be resolved by asking what 
effect a particular ruling on the question would have on the conduct of would-
be parties to the unlawful use of motor vehicles. The appropriate question was 
whether it was ‘incongruous’ for the plaintiff to be, under the criminal law, a 
party to the offence of unlawful use of a motor vehicle and to be able, under tort 
law, to sue the driver for damages in respect of an injury which arose from the 
very circumstances which constituted the offence.38 
Although a superficial reading of the Court’s comments in Miller might suggest 
otherwise, in characterising the purpose or policy of particular legislation the 
Court was concerned only with the purpose or policy that was manifested in the 
language of that provision, rather than with what might be supposed to be the 
economic, social or political motive for the enactment of the legislation stated 
at a high level of generality. Statements, for example, that the statutes which 
implement the Torrens system of title by registration have a purpose of promoting 
transparency as to ownership of land and interests therein,39 and that statutes 
which create road traffic rules have a purpose of promoting road safety40 are not 
particularly helpful in relation to the enquiry which has to be made and may be 
positively harmful. The form which a statute takes may be the result of a series 
of compromises among several competing goals. For this reason, it is the precise 
intention which can be found in the language of the legislation, rather than the 
supposed purpose of making land ownership transparent or roads safer, which 
ought to be the focus of the enquiry.41 This point was emphasised by Heydon J 
in his dissenting judgment in Equuscorp: ‘The scope and purpose of the statute 
depend solely on the meaning of its language.’42 His Honour remarked that ‘an 
anomalous result is relevant to statutory construction’ but concluded that there 
was ‘no sufficient anomaly between preventing enforcement of the loan contracts 
and permitting recovery of unpaid advances as money had and received’.43 
Although Heydon J was perhaps more conscious than the other members of the 
High Court of the slippery slope faced when attempting to resolve an apparent 
inconsistency between a common law rule and a statutory one by resorting to 
the purpose or policy of the statute, it is nevertheless clear that the High Court’s 
coherence principle has not been concerned with developing the common law 
to further the supposed public policy goals of certain legislative regimes. Elise 
Bant is thus correct in saying that ‘the High Court’s approach … has been to 
38 Ibid 455 [16], 479–80 [93].
39 See Bant, ‘Statute and Common Law’, above n 2, 374–5, citing Douglas J Whalan, The Torrens 
System in Australia (Law Book, 1982) 14–17.
40 Miller v Miller (2011) 242 CLR 446, 478 [89].
41 Raz, above n 17, 277, explaining the shortcomings of the ‘intention thesis’: that legislation reflects (or 
should reflect) the actual intentions of the law makers who promulgated the law.
42 Equuscorp (2012) 246 CLR 498, 549 [124].
43 Ibid 551–2 [133].
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“silo” evolution of judge-made and statutory principle unless their interaction is 
squarely in issue’.44  
The concept of coherence undoubtedly involves, as a minimum requirement, the 
absence of internal contradiction. However, as previously noted, coherence can 
be understood as being about much more than absence of internal contradiction. 
Robert Alexy and Aleksander Peczenik have said that a set of propositions may be 
said to be coherent to the extent that they share the same ‘supportive structure’.45 
The coherence of a set of normative propositions, according to this definition, 
involves something more than lack of contradiction either as propositions or in 
their application to concrete situations. On this definition, a set of rules and their 
applications may be free from contradiction and yet still lack coherence. The set 
is coherent only to the extent that all of the rules in the set can be explained as 
the outworking of a single principle. This concept of coherence lies at the heart 
of the legal formalism of Ernest Weinrib. For Weinrib, ‘a juridically intelligible 
relationship cannot consist in an aggregate of conceptually disjunct or inconsistent 
elements that, like a pile of pebbles, happen to be juxtaposed’.46 A body of rules, to 
be truly coherent, must have a unity which is founded upon a single normative idea:
inclusiveness is achieved not by adding another item to an aggregation, but by 
subsuming the item under a higher level of abstraction. Form is a unity, all the 
component characteristics of which comprise an ensemble whose intelligibility 
is greater than that of the sum of its parts. The components of a legal form thus 
collectively express a single idea. A form is accordingly not a manifold that can 
incorporate new elements without their being integrated into its organizing unity. 
If a form is to encompass the widest possible variety of juridical relationships, 
these relationships cannot be pluralistically tacked on to one another, but must 
exemplify the unifying idea of the form to which they belong. This requires 
abstracting to clarify the common structure that various relationships instantiate 
through their participation in a single form.47  
On this view, to continue with the example above, a set of legal outcomes in 
which performance of promises or undertakings was required is coherent to the 
extent that there is a common idea, such as the idea of a contract, which justifies 
the requirement in every case. The idea of contract can, in turn, be seen to be 
justified insofar as it is an instantiation of a higher principle which pervades a 
larger part of the system. In Weinrib’s view, the idea, articulated most famously 
by Kant that every individual is entitled to that degree of freedom of choice which 
is compatible with the same freedom of every other individual, is pervasive in 
44 Elise Bant, ‘Thieving Lawyers: Trust and Fidelity in the High Court: Legal Services Board v 
Gillespie-Jones’ on Melbourne Law School, Opinions on High (16 August 2013) <http://blogs.
unimelb.edu.au/opinionsonhigh/2013/08/16/bant-gillespie-jones>.
45 Alexy and Peczenik, above n 25, 131.
46 Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law’ (1988) 97 Yale Law 
Journal 949, 968.
47 Ibid 976. See also Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012) 41–3.
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private law.48 Every private law obligation is an instantiation of that more general 
idea, so rights to contractual performance can arise only where two parties have 
made reciprocal undertakings. One party cannot curtail the freedom of the other 
party (by insisting on the other party’s performance of its undertaking) while 
insisting that it is free not to perform its undertaking. Treating the parties equally 
demands that each party can control the choice of the other as to whether it will 
perform the undertaking.49 Other types of private law relationship, such as those 
which give rise to tort, unjust enrichment, and fiduciary liability, express the 
same idea.50  
There are legal scholars who adopt the concept of coherence as involving a 
common supportive structure, but who accept that there may be a plurality of 
ultimate meta-principles from which lower order rules derive. Neil MacCormick 
accepts that ‘coherence of a set of norms is a function of its justifiability under 
higher order principles or values’,51 but, unlike Weinrib, he believes that the set 
of norms may be related in the relevant way ‘instrumentally or intrinsically’.52 
This formulation appears to allow for a greater range of candidates for the higher 
principle or principles which are pervasive in the system than does Weinrib’s 
strictly monist, Kantian theory. Joseph Raz has spoken in favour of ‘local 
coherence’.53 Local coherence ‘is a mere by-product of the consistent application 
of a sound moral doctrine’.54 The pursuit of sound moral doctrines ‘generates 
pockets of coherence which exist, or should exist, where the law should reflect one 
overriding moral or evaluative concern’.55 In contrast to local coherence, ‘global 
coherence’ accounts of the law ‘impose coherence on the whole of the law’.56 Raz 
has objected to such accounts on the basis that they ‘underestimate … the degree 
to which morality itself is not a system but a plurality of irreducibly independent 
principles’ and they attempt ‘to idealize the law out of the concreteness of 
48 In The Idea of Private Law, Weinrib cited the following passage from Kant: ‘Right is therefore the 
sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in 
accordance with a universal law of freedom’: Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1995) 95, quoting Immanuel Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’ in Mary J Gregor 
(ed), Immanual Kant: Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 353, 387. 
49 Kant, above n 48, 421–2.
50 Ernest J Weinrib, ‘The Juridical Classification of Obligations’ in Peter Birks (ed), The Classification 
of Obligations (Clarendon Press, 1997) 37, 44–5. Weinrib argued that ‘the underlying assumption of 
torts is that the only limitation on the independent pursuit of one’s separate interests is the obligation 
to avoid wrongfully infringing another’s rights’, while the law of unjust enrichment assumes that 
‘because the parties are independently pursuing their separate interests, enrichments are not effective 
unless they are the products of an intent to enrich’. In Weinrib’s view, the much greater restriction 
of freedom of choice involved in fiduciary obligations is justified because ‘the beneficiary’s interests 
are so completely at the mercy of the fiduciary that the law disables the fiduciary from acting except 
in the beneficiary’s interests’.
51 MacCormick, above n 19, 238.
52 Ibid.
53 Raz, above n 17, 298.
54 Ibid 299.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid 298.
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politics’.57 Politics, understood as an activity whereby competing values are 
weighed and compromises or trade-offs between them are negotiated, is untidy 
and renders unlikely a scenario whereby the law will be completely coherent, but 
Raz does not object to this untidiness. For Raz, ‘[i]t is sanctioned by the morality 
of authoritative institutions’.58
It is remarkable that Raz does not appear to distinguish between different ways in 
which institutions are authoritative. In his view, since both legislative institutions 
and adjudicative institutions are involved in making law, both sets of institutions 
are necessarily involved in politics. The outcomes of political processes are 
inherently incoherent. What is implicit in Raz’s stance has been boldly asserted 
by Steve Hedley. Hedley has insisted that courts are ‘public authorities’ and 
private law is ‘a technique or instrument used by those authorities’.59 According 
to Hedley, private law has ‘reached the state it is in because of the efforts of 
a great many people — judges, lawyers, reformers, politicians, academics — 
over a considerable period of time’ and ‘compromises had to be made between 
competing goals’.60 For Hedley, both legislatures and courts are involved in an 
exercise of determining what rules will best promote the purposes that the system 
has to serve.
For a scholar such as Weinrib, who insists that private law, at least, must be 
coherent in the exacting sense conveyed by the Alexy and Peczenik definition, the 
distinction between what a legislature does and what courts do is crucial. Judges 
cannot engineer compromises between competing goals of the law because 
judges are ‘neither positioned to canvass the range of possible collective goals 
nor accountable to the community for the particular goal chosen’.61 This contrast 
between judges and legislators is echoed by Stephen McLeish’s comment that a 
legislature ‘is deciding the law for the polity, rather than deciding an outcome 
for parties to a specific controversy’ and ‘is accountable to the electors of the 
polity for the manner in which it performs its task’.62 The legislature, being 
the democratically accountable institution, is the forum in which compromises 
between competing goals can be negotiated and, as the product of that plurality 
of considerations, legislation necessarily cannot represent a coherent body of 
rules. Courts, by contrast, are accountable to principles which are intrinsic in the 
prior adjudicative practice. Therefore, while a certain degree of untidiness is to be 
tolerated and expected in the legislative process, coherence, in the exacting sense 
of the Alexy and Peczenik definition, must be an aspiration of the adjudicative 
process and the body of law that is generated by that process. The very legitimacy 
of the common law as a normative order that claims obedience is fundamentally 
57 Ibid. See also Morton J Horwitz, ‘The History of the Public/Private Distinction’ (1982) 130 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 1423, 1425–6.
58 Raz, above n 17, 298–9.
59 Steve Hedley, ‘Courts as Public Authorities, Private Law as Instrument of Government’ in Kit Barker 
and Darryn Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013) 89, 90.
60 Ibid 92.
61 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law¸  above n 48, 221.
62 McLeish, above n 2, 831.
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dependent upon the extent to which its rules cohere with one another and with the 
higher order principles that supply the moral justification of those rules. 
III  LEGISLATION AND COMMON LAW: ‘OIL AND WATER’63
If coherence is understood as being nothing more than an absence of inconsistency 
or contradiction at the level of the rules of a system, then, as the High Court has 
shown in cases such as Nelson, Equuscorp and Miller, there is unlikely to be very 
much real difficulty in achieving ‘coherence’ as between legislative and common 
law rules. Ascertaining when and to what extent a statutory rule and a common 
law rule speak to the same issue may require careful and sensitive interpretation, 
but there is no reason to suppose that the exercise is anything more than one of 
interpretation. However, the idea of treating legislation and common law as a 
coherent, single whole in the deeper sense defined by Alexy and Peczenik poses 
vastly greater challenges. Although there is an inevitable blurring of lines at the 
margins, in their classical or paradigm forms,64 differences in the form, content, 
and normative or moral bases of legislation and common law mean that they 
represent independent and incommensurable systems of rules. 
A  Form
Lon L Fuller spoke of two distinct forms of social ordering, namely ‘organization 
by common aims’ and ‘organization by reciprocity’.65 The former ‘requires that 
the participants want the same thing or things’.66 A necessary prerequisite is thus 
the knowledge of the existence of shared wants or objectives. The satisfaction 
of that prerequisite enables the design of rules and other institutions which 
facilitate the satisfaction of the shared wants or objectives. The mechanism of 
63 This is the metaphor used by Beatson to describe the historical approach to the interrelationship of 
legislation and common law: Beatson, above n 9, 300. Beatson did not identify the correspondents 
but, presumably, as common law was regarded as the fabric of the law, and legislation rode on top of 
common law, legislation is properly characterised as the oil.
64 For present purposes, it is assumed that in terms of the content of the law as opposed to its source, 
‘common law’ and ‘private law’ in their classical or paradigm forms are co-extensive. Although the 
interpretation of statutes is now a major part of the work of the courts, historically, and at its core, 
the common law was predominately concerned with what is now called private law, being the laws 
of contract, torts, property, and wills and trusts. See, eg, William Blackstone’s description of the 
common law: Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Clarendon Press, 
1765) vol 1, 68. Courts develop the common law by resolving disputes between individuals about 
whether one individual can demand something of or from the other individual. What is the correct 
way to resolve one dispute is also the correct way to resolve any materially identical dispute, but 
ultimately the question is one as to whether an individual is entitled to make a demand of another 
individual in the circumstances in which the demand is made.  
65 Lon L Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 353, 357 
(emphasis altered). See also Darryn Jensen, ‘Keeping Public Law in Its Place’ (2014) 33 University of 
Queensland Law Journal 285, 288; Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence 
of Lon L Fuller (Hart Publishing, 2012) 168–74.
66 Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’, above n 65, 358.
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‘organization by common aims’ is legislation.67 It is through the political and 
democratic process by which legislation is created that the common aims of 
society are identified, articulated, and pursued.68 On the other hand, the ‘proper 
province’ of reciprocity ‘lies in that area where divergent human objectives 
exist’.69 The common law, for the vast majority of its history and still at its core, 
is about social ordering through reciprocity. The law of contract is an obvious 
example of ordering by reciprocity. One party wishes to acquire goods or receive 
services and another party wishes to provide them. The terms under which one 
party acquires and the other provides are worked out by agreement. The parties 
are participating in a form of ordering that is common to them and consists of the 
terms that they have negotiated, but each is pursuing an objective which is her or 
his own.70 Accordingly, a contract cannot be understood in terms of a collective 
goal of either of the two parties directly involved or of the wider community. 
Rather, it has to be understood as a particular form of interaction — namely, one 
in which parties give or take or exchange things on terms which they have agreed 
and where those terms are an expression of the autonomy of each party. Whether 
the law is justified in recognising an obligation to perform upon a person is a 
question about whether that person’s interaction with another is an instantiation 
of the form which the law calls a ‘contract’.71 
The distinction between social ordering by common aims and social ordering 
by reciprocity, then, is a distinction between the use of (collective) power and 
authority to pursue shared objectives and the common observance (by pairs or 
groups of individuals) of certain modes of conduct that have tended to facilitate 
the pursuit by the individuals of their individual objectives. Whereas the former 
is predicated upon communal objectives and seeks to advance those objectives, 
the latter is predicated upon a shared view about the right forms of interpersonal 
conduct and ‘has no purpose except in the banal sense that it provides a body of 
expectations which individuals may rely upon in their pursuit of their disparate 
purposes’.72
67 Ibid. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc v Sandoz Inc, 
135 S Ct 831 (2015) where the majority of the US Supreme Court rejected a suggestion that a patent 
claim should be interpreted in the same way as a statute. Breyer J said: ‘Statutes, in general, address 
themselves to the general public … patents typically … rest upon consideration by a few private 
parties …’: at 840.
68 Even the great 19th century restatements of the law of sale of goods, partnership, and bills of exchange 
had an element of collective goals. In restating the law, these statutes sought to enhance society by 
making the law clear, certain and accessible. Modern regulatory theory has no hesitation in using the 
private law as a means of achieving collective, regulatory goals. This is a vast topic, but by way of 
general themes and overview, see Christine Parker and John Braithwaite, ‘Regulation’ in Peter Cane 
and Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford University Press, 2003) 119.
69 Fuller, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’, above n 65, 359.
70 See Weinrib, ‘The Juridical Classification of Obligations’, above n 50, 45, who says that contracts 
and gifts involve ‘the common pursuit of independent interests’ and that a transfer ‘requires a 
common undertaking … through which both parties consensually accomplish their purposes’. See 
also Stephen A Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford University Press, 2004) 103, 139, discussing the 
promissory and autonomy promoting bases of contract law.
71 See above n 48 and accompanying text.
72 Jensen, ‘Keeping Public Law in Its Place’, above n 65, 294.
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B  Content
Nigel Simmonds has argued that the fundamental concern of the common law 
has been ‘individual project pursuit’.73 This is because, ‘it protects the ability 
of individuals to pursue goals which are their own, and lead their lives as they 
please, within the constraints established by the general scheme of legal rules and 
rights’.74 In doing so, it creates a conceptual and practical space where individuals 
have the ‘freedom to formulate and pursue their own projects without warrant 
from other citizens or the state, and the value we place upon our collective power, 
primarily through law and politics, to change and maintain the social and related 
structures in which we live’.75 As such, the common law stands in opposition 
to legislation which classically is concerned with ‘collective project pursuit’.76 
Legislation ‘confers and regulates powers that are to be exercised, not for the 
benefit of the individual power-holder, but for and on behalf of the collectivity’.77 
In other words, legislation is a tool through which effect can be given to the 
inherently contestable and political decisions as to how the interests of the 
collective ought to be pursued. It enables the subordination of the individual’s 
private projects to the interests of the collective as understood by the legislature. 
The focus of the common law, on the other hand, is the individual person and the 
adjudication of disputes between individual persons. The establishment of rules 
that permit each individual to pursue her or his autonomy to the greatest extent 
that is consistent with an identical autonomy for each other person is a by-product 
of the adjudication of disputes. 
This is not to say that legislation does not, on occasion, facilitate ‘individual project 
pursuit’78 by establishing or restating rules of individual conduct. Additionally, 
legislation may, for reasons associated with the administration of justice, restrict 
the ways in which individual projects may be pursued. For example, the Statute of 
Frauds provisions are predicated on the idea that individuals have projects which 
73 N E Simmonds, ‘The Possibility of Private Law’ in John Tasioulas (ed), Laws, Values and Social 
Practices (Dartmouth, 1997) 129, 144. A similar analysis of what differentiates public and private law 
is advanced by Peter Cane, ‘Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction’ in Nicholas Bamforth 
and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2003) 247, 
274 and by William Lucy, ‘What’s Private about Private Law’ in Andrew Robertson and Tang Hang 
Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 47, 58. There are, of course, those who 
take a different view of the common law: see, eg, Stephen Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: 
Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal Reasoning (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Such views, however, tend to deny any possibility of any systematic analysis of the common law and 
are thus self-defeating: see, eg, Allan Beever and Charles Rickett, ‘Interpretative Legal Theory and 
the Academic Lawyer’ (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 320.
74 Simmonds, ‘The Possibility of Private Law’, above n 73, 145.
75 Lucy, above n 73, 58, citing Simmonds, ‘The Possibility of Private Law’, above n 73, 144.
76 Simmonds, ‘The Possibility of Private Law’, above n 73, 144. See also Lucy, above n 73, 59; Cane, 
‘Accountability and the Public/Private Distinction’, above n 73, 274.
77 Simmonds, ‘The Possibility of Private Law’, above n 73, 145.
78 One might give as an example here modern consumer legislation, such as the Australian Consumer 
Law. Insofar as this seeks to redress the asymmetry of information as between retailer and consumer, 
it may be said to support individual project pursuit. See, eg, Commonwealth Consumer Affairs 
Advisory Council, ‘Consumer Rights: Statutory Implied Conditions and Warranties’ (Issues Paper, 
Commonwealth of Australia, July 2009).
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they wish to pursue but provide that the person who chooses to create or dispose 
of an interest in land must adopt particular formalities.79 Such provisions override 
individual autonomy in cases in which the required formalities or evidential 
requirements are not satisfied but they are, nonetheless, integrated with the 
common law rules which facilitate individual autonomy in creating or disposing 
of interests in land. The effect of those provisions is, in turn, tempered by an 
accretion of equitable doctrine around them. Equity ensures that the requirements 
of form cannot be used to block the enforcement of rights where the evidence of 
an intention to create or transfer an interest in land is overwhelming.80 There is a 
symbiosis of common law, statute law and equity which facilitates the individual 
projects of the parties to the extent that there is a reasonable level of assurance that 
the alleged transaction does, in fact, represent a meeting of two individual projects. 
Equally, the common law can and does serve the public interest. There are likely 
to be many instances in which this is the case. However, we should not confuse 
the effects of rules with the rationale or justification for those rules. Thus, for 
example, the fact that the law of tort imposes liability for injuries may have the 
effect of improving public safety. Judges may have regularly referred to historical 
or anticipated effects in their reasons for judgment. That does not mean that 
improving public safety is the rationale of or justification for these rules.81 The 
rules of the law of tort are historically and, arguably, intrinsically about the pursuit 
of private projects. Tort law restricts the means that individuals may adopt to 
pursue their personal projects, so that each person’s freedom to pursue personal 
projects is consistent with an identical freedom of every other person. The fact 
that following a particular rule has improved public safety — assuming that the 
aggregate effect on public safety can be measured — is a reasonable motive for 
not abolishing the rule once it has become the rule, but it does not retrospectively 
justify restricting particular defendants as to the means that they may adopt in the 
pursuit of their personal projects. The imposition of individual duties to refrain 
from certain types of means is characteristic of tort law and reflects tort law’s 
concern with each person’s use of the means at her or his disposal in a way which 
is consistent with every other person’s enjoyment of a similar freedom. It may be 
said, at the risk of repeating the point, that the fact that tort law has had the effect 
of improving public safety is a reason for persisting with tort law but it does not 
explain why tort law takes the particular form that it takes.  
79 See, eg, Property Law Act 1958 (Vic) ss 53(1)(a)–(c).
80 The doctrines of part performance and ‘common intention’ constructive trusts are examples of this 
accretion of equitable doctrine.
81 The fact that, on occasion, courts considering common law rules may have introduced public interest 
considerations as justifications for their decisions may explain why some areas of the law seem so 
resistant to coherent explanation. The law of negligence appears to suffer from this malaise. See 
especially Allan Beever, ‘Formalism in Music and Law’ (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 
213, 234; Allan Beever, Forgotten Justice: The Forms of Justice in the History of Legal and Political 
Theory (Oxford University Press, 2013) 266 (the anecdote about the boy smashing his brother’s toy). 
See also Lionel Smith, ‘Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations’ (2013) 7 
Journal of Equity 87 — concerning deterrence as effect (but not rationale).
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If, as MacCormick said, ‘the coherence of a set of [legal rules] is a function of 
its justifiability under higher order principles or values’,82 then the interpretation 
of legal rules is a question of whether the application of a particular rule to a 
particular factual situation is justifiable in terms of the higher order principles or 
values which are thought to give coherence to the set of legal rules. Interpretations 
which maintain the coherence of the set in terms of the relevant principles or 
values are to be preferred to those which undermine it. Simmonds observed 
that, where interpretation of rules proceeds by asking whether applying the 
rule to a particular fact pattern furthers a collective goal, ‘our sphere of private 
immunity’ is insecure.83 He suggested that ‘[l]egal rules will exhibit the highest 
degree of determinacy of meaning, and will be most resistant to the possibilities 
of degeneration into bureaucratic “purposive” interpretation, when the rules 
reflect understandings and expectations that already characterize the community 
regulated by the legal rules’.84 Where rules are understood as expressing 
expectations about proper modes of interpersonal conduct, those rules define 
a sphere within which individuals may pursue their individual projects. Where 
rules are understood in terms of the pursuit of collective goals, there cannot 
be any protected sphere for the pursuit of individual projects. Every claim to a 
domain of free action would be defeated wherever pursuit of a collective goal 
demands it. Only a system of legal rules which finds its coherence in the forms 
of the established constraints and the principles or values which provide the best 
possible justification for those constraints can be a system of private law in the 
sense intended by Simmonds.85
C  Normative Values
It may be that the ultimate normative and moral values which legislation and 
common instantiate are incommensurate and incompatible. Weinrib has offered 
a view of the law as the manifestation of one of two broad conceptions of justice: 
corrective justice or distributive justice.86 The common law, or at least the 
private law, is to be understood in terms of a highly sophisticated combination 
of Aristotelian corrective justice and Kantian right. Thus, the private law is to 
be understood as manifesting two principal features. First, corrective justice is 
concerned to restore, repair, or correct an injustice that has occurred as between 
82 MacCormick, above n 19, 238.
83 Simmonds, ‘The Possibility of Private Law’, above n 73, 146.
84 Ibid 147 (citations omitted). 
85 Simmonds’ position is, in this respect, similar to that of F A Hayek:
 the only method yet discovered of defining a range of expectations which will be … 
protected, and thereby reducing the mutual interference of people’s actions with each other’s 
intentions, is to demarcate for every individual a range of permitted actions by designating 
(or rather making recognizable by the application of rules to the concrete facts) ranges of 
objects over which only particular individuals are allowed to dispose and from the control 
of which all others are excluded. 
 F A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy (Routledge & Kegan Paul, first published 1973–79, 1982 ed) vol 1, 107.  
86 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, above n 48, 61.
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the parties to a transaction or relationship. Thus, fundamentally, corrective justice 
is concerned with the reasons for recognising a duty to restore, repair or correct 
and the circumstances in which that duty arises. Secondly, and possibly more 
importantly, corrective justice manifests a bipolar or correlative structure that 
links plaintiff and defendant, right and wrong, and losses and gains together as 
part of a single conception and not as separate, coincidental considerations. The 
correlative, bipolar structure, manifested in law in the right-duty relationship, 
allows for no considerations other than those arising out of the transactional 
relation of the parties. Thus for example, in seeking to correct the injustice 
arising from an injury to X caused by Y, the law cannot admit considerations 
such as whether the imposition of liability would be efficient or would promote 
societal aims. Distributive justice, on the other hand, is about the just distribution 
of the goods of a society.87 It is, therefore, not concerned with the justice of the 
position as between a plaintiff and a defendant, but is concerned with justice at 
a societal level. Thus, for example, that particular form of distributive justice 
called utilitarianism seeks to maximise the overall utility of society, but is 
largely unconcerned with the effects on particular individuals. As such, it may 
subordinate the interests of the individual to the needs of the group.88 Legislation, 
insofar as it is concerned with the collective interest and common aims, thus 
seems to instantiate concerns associated with distributive justice. 
In Weinrib’s view, corrective justice and distributive justice are fundamentally 
distinct conceptions that exist in binary opposition.89 They are, therefore, 
fundamentally incompatible and incommensurable. On this basis, the legal rules 
that instantiate these two forms of justice must also be incompatible and any attempt 
to render them coherent would be misguided, impossible and inappropriate. In 
holding this view, Weinrib appears to accept that the incompatibility of the two 
forms of justice is a matter of a priori logic. There are, however, other accounts of 
private law which do not accept this premise and attempt to combine corrective 
justice and distributive justice. Prominent among them is the account given by 
Hanoch Dagan,90 in which the role of distributive justice was to set a baseline 
distribution of benefits and burdens for the parties’ relationship and the role of 
corrective justice was to restore the parties to the baseline distribution wherever it 
has been disturbed.91 Dagan argued that the initial entitlements of the parties are 
87 The literature on the question of distributive justice is immense, but for present purposes see Lon L 
Fuller, ‘Some Reflections on Legal and Economic Freedoms — A Review of Robert L Hale’s “Freedom 
Through Law”’ (1954) 54 Columbia Law Review 70, 81; Samuel Scheffler, ‘Distributive Justice, the 
Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law’ (2015) 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 213.
88 The fact that ‘[u]tilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons’ is one major 
source of criticism: Rawls, above n 16, 27.
89 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, above n 48, 61–3.
90 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice’ (1999) 98 Michigan Law Review 
138.
91 Ibid 150.
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defined by reference to ‘the social vision respecting the parties’ relationship’.92 A 
limitation of such accounts, from Weinrib’s perspective, is that the justification of 
the baseline distribution cannot proceed from within an adjudication with respect 
to a particular bipolar transaction:
Corrective justice involves no decision as to the selection of a collective purpose. 
When construing a transaction in accordance with corrective justice, the adjudicator 
does not choose one scheme of correction over another but rather specifies the 
meaning of corrective justice with respect to the transaction in question. The 
contrast with distributive justice is stark. The varieties of distribution are the 
various ways of mediating relationships through different distributive purposes, 
but for the relationship of doer and sufferer, a single conception of corrective justice 
gets worked out in accordance with the transaction’s particular facts and history.93
A distributive consideration or a particular compromise between two or more 
such considerations can justify the liability of one party to a transaction to the 
other through the decision of a body which has the authority to select among the 
possible distributions and engineer compromises between different distributional 
criteria — namely, a legislature. Dagan does, however, acknowledge that ‘open 
normative discussion’94 was needed in order to choose among the various 
possible distributions for a particular class of relationships, but maintained that 
it was inevitable that the initial entitlements of parties would be determined by 
such distributive choices.95 Accordingly, Dagan accepts as inevitable a level of 
incoherence (relative to the more exacting definition of coherence) which Weinrib 
does not. 
John Gardner also sees distributive justice considerations at work in the private 
law, at least in the law of torts. While he accepts that corrective justice is a 
necessary part of any explanation of the law of torts,96 Gardner sees tort litigation 
as involving localised distributive justice in the sense that the apparatus for 
adjudicating disputes necessarily involves the distribution of access to court-based 
adjudication and enforcement of claims.97 However, Gardner’s thesis conflates 
two conceptually distinct questions. On the one hand, there is the question of 
92 Ibid 153. Accounts of particular areas of private law which are similar to Dagan’s account are Peter 
Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ [2001] New Zealand Law Review 401; Matthew Harding, 
‘Constructive Trusts and Distributive Justice’ in Elise Bant and Michael Bryan (eds), Principles 
of Proprietary Remedies (Thomson Reuters, 2013) 19. Another leading corrective justice theorist, 
Jules Coleman, does not dismiss the possibility that corrective justice and distributive justice can 
be combined: Jules L Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to 
Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 2001) 53.
93 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, above n 48, 211–12.
94 Dagan, ‘The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice’, above n 90, 152–3.
95 Ibid 153. Similarly, Cane was of the view that tort cases inevitably gave rise to distributive questions 
and suggested that there were only two ways of dealing with the problem — ‘[e]ither courts must be 
barred … from dealing with cases that raise distributive issues that are … more appropriately dealt 
with by another branch of government, or steps must be taken to make good the “democratic deficit” 
under which courts labour’: Cane, ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ above n 92, 420.
96 John Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice’ (2011) 30 Law and 
Philosophy 1.
97 John Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law for? Part 2: The Place of Distributive Justice’ in John Oberdiek (ed), 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 2014) 335.
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the intelligibility of claims by one party to an interaction against another, which 
arise independently of the existence of a system of adjudication and for the 
actualisation of which the system of adjudication is brought into existence. On 
the other hand, there is the matter of the institutionalisation of the enforcement 
of intelligible claims through a system of adjudication. Weinrib was concerned 
with the former question. In focusing upon the system of adjudication,98 Gardner 
mistakes the necessarily contingent mechanisms for enforcement for an essential 
feature of the claim of the individual plaintiff against a particular defendant.99  
Returning to the question of integrating common law and legislation, it might be 
observed that an important difference between distributive justice and corrective 
justice accounts is the pluralism of the former, in their openness to a multiplicity 
of competing distributional criteria, and the monism of the latter. As a monist 
account, an exclusively corrective justice account is ipso facto a more coherent 
account of legal practice. Moreover, since distributive justice is necessarily 
pluralist, the distributional criteria embodied in a statute may conflict with 
whatever values (distributive or otherwise) that are embedded in the common 
law or, for that matter, the distributional criteria which inform other statutes. The 
whole point of a statute may be to override the distributive effects of common law 
rules in relation to particular relationships or transactions.100 Accordingly, such 
legislation does not combine with the common law in a single coherent system. 
It overrides the common law in respect of the relationships or transactions which 
fall within its ambit. Such coherence as is possible is, therefore, the coherence 
of non-contradiction rather than the more exacting idea of coherence as the 
outworking of a single principle.
IV  CAN OIL AND WATER MIX?
The age of statutes has not only changed the character of the law, but it also 
presents the issue of the coherence of the law as an infinitely more acute problem. 
In the face of the sheer volume of legislation now pouring from parliament, 
and the extent of its coverage, the silo-approach to the relationship between 
legislation and common law is no longer viable, as there is now at least as much 
legislative oil as there is common law water. For present purposes, the modern 
reality has two important consequences. First, if the volume and extent of 
legislation in our law is now such that we cannot plausibly treat legislation as a 
98  Ibid 340–4.
99 As merely one means of vindicating a claim, court-based mechanisms cannot be a necessary feature 
of the claim. Moreover, court-based mechanisms have undergone a huge decline in use in the last 
20 years owing to the proliferation of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms: see Hazel Genn, 
Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
100 For example, the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), in requiring the Family Court to consider, in matrimonial 
property cases, contributions ‘made in the capacity of homemaker or parent’: at s 79(4)(c), and 
‘the physical and mental capacity of each of [the parties] for appropriate gainful employment’: at 
ss 75(2)(b), 79(4)(e), would appear to be concerned with ensuring more favourable outcomes for 
non-breadwinner parties to marriages than would be possible under the common law and equitable 
principles, which focus upon financial contributions.   
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mere exception that operates only at the level of bare rules and does not disturb 
the underlying normative coherence of the common law, then the coherence of 
the law is moving further from our grasp. To the extent that we regard coherence 
as a fundamental quality and condition of law (as distinct from other forms of 
social organisation), the presence of two incompatible bodies of law threatens 
the very legitimacy and moral authority of our legal system as a legal system. 
Secondly, from the perspective of the issue of the coherence of the law, the rule 
of parliamentary supremacy as the means of resolving inconsistencies (at least at 
the level of principle or policy) may no longer be an adequate or appropriate meta-
principle.101 While the rule of parliamentary supremacy may be able to continue 
to resolve particular inconsistencies between particular rules, each time this 
occurs, and the prevailing rule is at odds with the deeper principles and normative 
values of the common law, more of the normative coherence of the common law 
is compromised. As mentioned, when statutes were narrower in their scope and 
targeted at specific defects in the pre-existing law, as was the case historically, 
the coherence of the law was compromised only infrequently or only in a small 
number of defined areas. Thus, the level of incoherence introduced did not 
threaten the overall coherence of the law. However, the explosion in legislation 
means that the likelihood of common law rules conflicting with statutory rules is 
now much greater, so the level of incoherence being introduced into the common 
law is also much greater. We are, therefore, presented with the question of how 
we should understand the relationship between legislation and the common law 
and, in particular, how we might integrate the oil and water of our legal system. 
One solution to the incoherence generated by the incompatible normative bases of 
legislation and common law is simply to live with the normative incoherence and, 
as the High Court seems content to do, address those inconsistencies as and when 
they manifest themselves as incompatible rules. This solution would pay homage 
to the practical tradition that has always marked out the common law from its 
Civilian neighbours and would represent an acceptance that, while the law might 
not work in theory, it still works in the vast majority of cases as a reason for 
action for its subjects and as a dispute resolution mechanism.102 This solution 
would also reflect a frank recognition that, if the trend of increasing legislative 
coverage of areas formerly the province of the common law continues, the issue 
will eventually cease to be of importance as ‘pure common law’103 is increasingly 
relegated to a few obscure backwaters of the law. Whether this is a good thing or 
not is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is impossible to deny the ‘incremental 
101 In any event the idea of the supremacy of legislation may be a relatively recent development. Both 
Stone and Pound suggest that it only became firmly entrenched after the Glorious Revolution of 1688: 
Justice Harlan F Stone, ‘The Common Law in the United States’ (1936) 50 Harvard Law Review 
4; Pound, above n 14, 392, citing Brinton Coxe, An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional 
Legislation: Being a Commentary on Parts of the Constitution of the United States (Kay and Brother, 
1893) 179.
102 The phrase, ‘[w]ell, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory’ is attributed 
to Warren Buffett: see Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc, 25 
February 1985 <http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1984.html>.
103 As opposed to ‘statute-based common law’, which develops as a more civil law style gloss on the 
statute: see Burrows, above n 5, 240.
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codification’ or the ‘civilising’ trend apparent in many areas of Australian law.104 
As both federal and state legislatures churn out ever more legislation, the issue of 
coherence will be less concerned with the relationship between common law and 
statute than with the relationship between federal and state statutes.105 
The idea of coherence as non-contradiction sits well with what has probably been 
the dominant account of the concept of law in the Anglo-Australian tradition, 
namely legal positivism. In this tradition, Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, Kelsen and, 
most recently, H L A Hart, have contributed to a view of law as ‘posited’ as 
opposed to given. Although there are sharp differences within legal positivism, 
all would agree that, at its core, positivism is about the idea that ‘whether a given 
norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, 
depends on its sources, not its merits’.106 Positivism thus identifies what counts as 
law by the criterion of its source: it is ‘law’ if its source (whether that be a text or the 
actions of particular institution or official) is one that the legal system recognises 
as authoritative. In Hart’s work, the source/authority criterion was labelled the 
‘rule of recognition’.107 If a purported rule satisfies the rule of recognition (for 
example, it was enacted by the ‘Queen in Parliament’), then it qualifies as ‘law’, 
irrespective of whether the rule so enacted fails to cohere with the rest of the 
law. Hart’s rule of recognition idea is not logically confined to an idea that legal 
validity depends upon the endorsement of a sovereign legislature of unlimited 
power but Hart contemplated that the existence of a rule of recognition for a legal 
system, whatever its precise content, ‘is a matter of fact’.108 For Hart, a rule of 
recognition was concerned with whose pronouncements counted as a source of 
valid rules rather than with content-based criteria.109 Therefore, in relation to the 
interaction of common law and legislation, as long as legal propositions which 
satisfy the applicable source/authority criterion do not prescribe contradictory 
outcomes in particular cases, the law can adequately do its work of supplying 
‘standards of correct judicial decision’.110 The meta-principle of Parliamentary 
104 See, eg, Lord Jonathan Mance, ‘Is Europe Aiming to Civilise the Common Law’ (2007) 18 European 
Business Law Review 77. One suspects the term ‘civilise’ was intended to be provocative.
105 See, eg, McDonald, above n 13, 454, in the context of the fractured and inconsistent pattern of 
federal and state tort law legislation. Such is the intrusion of legislation into the common law and 
the inconsistencies between federal and state legislation that, even though there is a single final 
court of appeal, it is difficult to take seriously the idea that there can be an Australian common 
law. See Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49, 62 
(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); cf Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Trusts and Statutes’ (2015) 
39 Melbourne University Law Review 629, 631.
106 John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (2001) 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 199.
107 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 94.
108 Ibid 110.
109 Note that in the postscript to the second and third editions of The Concept of Law, Hart denied that 
his theory was a ‘plain-fact theory of positivism’, but also rejected the idea (which he attributed to 
Dworkin) that ‘the purpose of law is to justify the use of coercion’: ibid 248; H L A Hart, The Concept 
of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 248.
110 This phrase is taken from Hart. Hart (in talking about the possibility of judicial development of the 
law) said:
 At any given moment judges, even those of a supreme court, are parts of a system the 
rules of which are determinate enough at the centre to supply standards of correct judicial 
decision.
 Hart, The Concept of Law, above n 107, 145.
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supremacy provides, in effect, that the common law cannot contradict statute law, 
so as to provide the necessary determinacy.
This solution would not satisfy the more exacting idea of coherence that has been 
discussed in this paper. When applied to law, that idea of coherence casts a negative 
judgement upon propositions of law which fail to express a higher order principle 
which animates the system as a whole, notwithstanding that such propositions 
may satisfy the source/authority criterion. Just as the reasons given by a judge in 
deciding a case may be subjected to criticism on the basis that they do not represent 
the best possible fit with the prior adjudicative practice, legislation that meets the 
source/authority criterion specified by the rule of recognition could be regarded 
as ‘law only in the merely pre-interpretive sense’.111 Its meaning as law would 
have to be determined in the light of an assumption that, whatever the legislature 
intended, it did not intend to undermine the coherence of the law. In other words, 
the interpretation of legislation would proceed on an assumption that it forms part 
of the same system as the pre-existing law, the existence of system (as opposed 
to an ad hoc accumulation of propositions which fortuitously do not contradict) 
being a fundamental characteristic of law.112 As Simmonds has said, ‘the judicial 
task is one of fidelity, not to a rule of recognition, but to the idea of law itself’.113 It 
is not being proposed that legislation that fails the coherence test should be seen 
as invalid. The solution that is being proposed represents a movement away from 
the ‘bivalence of legal validity and invalidity’ of particular rules and towards an 
enquiry as to what extent the practice of a particular community counts as a legal 
system, which is ‘a matter of degree’.114 Such a solution would still require a rule 
of recognition to identify what practices have to be surveyed and interpreted in 
order to find the law.
At least two objections to this idea might be anticipated. First, the idea that 
the meaning of a statutory text might be influenced by the needs of coherence 
faces the objection that it is inconsistent with the constitutional supremacy of 
Parliament and of legislation.115 On the other hand, such an approach is entirely 
consistent with the idea that courts are established to interpret the law and are, 
accordingly, the final arbiters of meaning for both common law and legislative 
rules. As the comments of the High Court discussed above illustrate, it is an 
entirely proper part of the judicial function to seek coherence in the law through 
the process of interpretation. The work of judges and scholars is and has always 
111 T R S Allan, ‘Interpretation, Injustice, and Integrity’ (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 58, 67.
112 A similar idea is found in Beatson, above n 9, 313: ‘It is the task of commentators and judges to 
realise “the idea of a unified system of judge made and statute law woven into a seamless web by the 
processes of adjudication”’, citing Stone, above n 101, 12. See also Lon L Fuller, Anatomy of the Law 
(Frederick A Praeger, 1968) 94 (emphasis in original): 
 Those responsible for creating and administering a body of legal rules will always be 
confronted by a problem of system. The rules applied to the decision of the individual 
controversies cannot simply be isolated exercises of judicial wisdom. They must be brought 
into, and maintained in, some systematic interrelationship; they must display some coherent 
internal structure.
113 N E Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford University Press, 2007) 157.
114 Ibid.
115 McLeish, above n 2, 834.
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been to seek to provide the best, most consistent and coherent explanation of what 
would otherwise be a jumble of ad hoc judicial decisions limited to the particular 
facts. We are accustomed to this process in relation to the common law. Indeed, 
the body of rules and principles that we call the common law is the product of 
a process of incremental interpretation and reinterpretation of the mass of legal 
materials slowly approaching, but never reaching, complete coherence. The same 
is true of legislation. As Justice Gageler has recently noted: 
Over time, the meaning of a statutory text is reinformed by the accumulated 
experience of courts in the application of the law to the facts in a succession of 
cases. The meaning of a statutory text is also informed, and reinformed, by the 
need for the courts to apply the text each time, not in isolation, but as part of the 
totality of the common law and statute law as it then exists.116 
Of course, the ability or appropriateness of the court’s efforts to integrate 
legislation into the totality of the law is necessarily limited by the principle of 
‘judicial economy’.117 The function of the courts is, first and foremost, to resolve 
the particular disputes between the parties that come before them and the extent 
to which even a final appellate court should adopt a prescriptive or ‘top down’ 
view of the law continues to be a matter for debate. Nevertheless, it is the case 
that, whatever may be the content of the principle of parliamentary supremacy, it 
is for the courts to determine the meaning of a statutory text. A legislature which 
is unhappy with a judicial interpretation of a statutory text has no remedy apart 
from amending the statutory text so as to provide a text which better conveys the 
legislature’s original intention.
The second conceivable objection is that while we may all agree that coherence 
is a worthy aspiration, it can never be more than an aspiration. In Raz’s hands, 
this objection rests on the apparently empirical observation that the processes 
that create law, both legislative and adjudicative, are fundamentally political 
processes that reflect compromises and pragmatism. Thus, while we may find 
pockets of coherence in the law, the law as a whole is necessarily the untidy 
‘debris of past political struggles’.118 As discussed above, while legislation is 
necessarily a political process, this is not obviously true of the common law, and 
in particular the private law. In any event, even if it is true that legislation is 
inherently incoherent, this may be seen as an argument in favour of a coherence 
criterion. If we accept, as even Raz does, that coherence is a good thing, it surely 
follows that we ought to try to work the legislation ‘pure’.119 A court must interpret 
that text as part of the totality of the law and, like the builders of Neurath’s ship, 
the courts must constantly strive to remake the law out of the best materials 
available.120 The fact that the pursuit of coherence is difficult is not a reason for 
not trying, as Peter Birks reminded us:
116 Stephen Gageler, ‘Common Law Statutes and Judicial Legislation: Statutory Interpretation as a 
Common Law Process’ (2011) 37 Monash University Law Review 1, 1–2.
117 Ibid 3.
118 Raz, above n 17, 280.
119 See Corbin, above n 14, 672 n 15.
120 Otto Neurath, ‘Protocol Sentences’ (George Schick trans) in A J Ayer (ed), Logical Positivism (Free 
Press, 1959) 199, 201.
Monash University Law Review (Vol 42, No 2)382
there hangs in the balance the question whether the pursuit of rationality in law, 
which is certainly exceedingly arduous, will be laid aside before it has been 
properly tried. … As the difficulty of saintliness is no argument in favour of 
unrestrained evil, so the impossibility of perfectly attaining these goals is no 
argument for preferring unrestrained intellectual disorder. Disorderly law is no 
more than an alibi for illegitimate power.121
V  CONCLUSION
In a number of cases over the last decade, the High Court of Australia has identified 
coherence in the law as an important objective. Moreover, the High Court seems 
to have suggested that the objective is and ought to be coherence of the totality 
of the common law and legislation as a seamless whole. On closer examination, 
however, the High Court seems to have meant only that the rules of the common 
law and legislation should be free of internal inconsistency and contradiction. 
Understood in this way, the pursuit of coherence is a manageable task. Insofar 
as the common law and legislation reflect fundamentally different organising 
principles and normative values, the pursuit of a thorough normative coherence 
between common law and legislation would constitute a radical departure from 
certain prevalent assumptions about the relationship between these two bodies of 
law, whatever may be the attractions of a thoroughly coherent law. In the face of 
the enormous proliferation of legislation in recent years, and the greater inroads 
legislation is making into areas that were hitherto the sole domain of the common 
law, we are left with the pressing question of how we deal with the inconsistencies 
between common law rules and statutory rules.
121 Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 Western Australian 
Law Review 1, 99. See also French, above n 105, 631.
